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IN PURSUIT OF WAGES BASED ON JOB VALUE-
GUNTHER V. COUNTY OF WASHINGTON
During the early 1960's, Congress twice enacted legislation designed to
end sex discrimination' in the compensation practices 2 of private industry. 3
With the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA),4 it prohibited wage differentials be-
tween the sexes, but only when men and women perform equal work in the
same establishment. 5 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,6 enacted one year
later, broadly proscribes any sex discrimination against individuals with re-
spect to compensation. 7  Although both statutes ban sex discrimination in
wages, the language of Title VII sweeps wide enough to prohibit unequal
1. The executive branch also became involved in the effort to end sex discrimination in the
private sector by mandating that all federal contractors and subcontractors undertake affirmative
action. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1979), as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375,
32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (1967), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). Sex discrimination
guidelines issued by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, responsible for ad-
ministering the executive orders, are found at 41 C.F.R. § 60-20 (1979). See generally B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 740-66 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as SCHLEI & GROSSMAN].
2. As used in this Note, a "compensation practice" refers to any practice of an employer to
reward employee performance with money or monetary substitutes, including both wages and
fringe benefits. "Pay" and "wages" will be used to denote payment for services rendered, or,
more simply, the gross amount of an employee's paycheck, whether the employee is paid on an
hourly or salaried basis.
3. In the early 1970's, Congress amended both the Equal Pay Act (The Fair Labor Stan-
dard Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-259, § 1(a), 88 Stat. 55 (1974)), and Title VII (Pub.
L. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103 (1972)), to apply them to governmental units as well as private
industry.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976).
5. Section 6(d)(1) of the Equal Pay Act (EPA) provides in full:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall dis-
criminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, be-
tween employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such estab-
lishment at a rate less than the rate at which he [or she] pays wages to employees of
the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to
(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor
other than sex: Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in
violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this
subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
7. Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII provides, in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex ..
42 U.S.C. § 20 0 0 e-2 (1976) (emphasis added).
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pay for equal work and to extend beyond the EPA's equal pay for equal
work principle. Additionally, the EPA covers fewer employers, 8 furnishes
less tractable remedies,9 and is governed by different legal standards than
8. As an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §9 201-219
(1976), the EPA's coverage is generally coextensive with that of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
H. REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1963); 29 C.F.R. § 800.5 (1979). The Fair Labor
Standards Act covers "enterprises," with two or more employees, "engaged in commerce or the
production of goods for commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 203(r), (s) (1976). See 29 C.F.R. §§ 800.5-
.11 (1979). Although a substantial number of employers are exempted from the Fair Labor
Standard Act's coverage, see 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1976), Congress has deleted the most significant
of these exemptions from the EPA's coverage. See id. § 213(a), as amended by Pub. L. No.
92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (1972) (eliminating the exemption of bona fide executive, administrative, or
professional employees); id. § 213(a)(2), as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (1974)
(removing the retail or service establishment exemption). Section 3(d) of the EPA further limits
its coverage to an "establishment," 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), which is defined as a "distinct physical
place of business," not "an entire business or enterprise." 29 C.F.R. § 800.108 (1979). Thus, no
violation of the EPA arises when the employees receiving different rates of pay work in different
plants or stores. Hodgson v. City Stores, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 942 (N.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd sub
nor. Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1973). Cf. Brennan v. Goose Creek
Consol. Independent School Dist., 519 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1975) (custodians at a school district's
several elementary schools worked in a single establishment).
By contrast, Title VII covers any employer in an industry "affecting commerce who has fifteen
or more employees fbr each working (lay in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year .... . 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), as amended by Pub. L. No.
92-261, § 2(2), 86 Stat. 103 (1972). At least one court has held that Title Vll's broad coverage is
not narrowed in a case of sex discrimination in wages by the EPA's establishment requirement.
Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 449 F. Supp. 397, 407 (W.D. Pa. 1978). Accord, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.8(a) (1979.
9. Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 216-217 (1976) (the EPA) mith 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976)
(Title VII). Because the EPA amended the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-219 (1976), remedies for its violation are found at sections 16 and 17 of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. Id. §§ 216-217. Section 16(a) provides seldom-used criminal penalties for willful
Fair Labor Standards Act violations. Section 16(b) provides that: (1) reasonable attorney's fees
are recoverable; (2) class action-like suits may be initiated with the written consent of all simi-
larly situated plaintiffs; and (3) prevailing plaintiffs may recover wages due plus liquidated dam-
ages. Id. § 216(a).
Because relatively few EPA suits are brought by employees, few awards of attorney's fees
have been made Under vet unsettled principles. See Hodgson v. Miller Brewing Co., 457 F.2d
221, 229 (7th Cir. 1972) (noting that the general public was benefited, the court awarded
$20,000); McClanahan v. Matthews, 440 F.2d 320, 324 (6th Cir. 1971) (approving an award fbr
less than the claimed amount). By contrast, Title VII standards are well-established: a prevailing
plaintiff may recover reasonable attorney's fees unless the award is unjust due to special cir-
cumnstances. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975) (citing Newman v. Piggie
Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968)); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 804
(4th Cir. 1971). See also Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 517 F.2d 387, 392 (7th Cir. 1975).
The class action requirements contained in Federal Rule 23, applicable in Title VII cases, do
not require written consent of all those similarly situated. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Whether an EPA
plaintiff can use the Rule 23 class action device in lieu of § 16(b) has been settled quite differ-
ently by courts. Compare Paddison v. Fidelity Bank, 60 F.R.D. 695, 700 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
('[T]he Rule 23 class action device is not available in an Equal Pay Act case," but the court
certified a Rule 23 class for a Title VII unequal pay complaint) and Maguire v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 55 F. R. D. 48, 49 (S.D. N.Y. 1972) (same) and Schmidt v. Fuller Brush Co., 527
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Title VII. 10 Therefore, when a claim of discrimination in wages is brought
under Title VII, a problem arises as to whether and to what extent the
provisions of the EPA are controlling."
Recognizing this problem of overlapping coverage, the Title VII Congress
adopted a floor amendment to assure the continued vitality of the EPA. The
amendment, offered by Senator Bennett, provides that Title VII does not
prohibit wage or compensation differentials between the sexes when those
differentials are authorized by the EPA.1 2  Thus, the Bennett Amendment
F.2d 532, 536 (8th Cir. 1975) (same) with Bradford v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 60 F.R.D. 432,
437 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (class action available but limited to plaintiffs who "opt in" under § 16(b)).
See also Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 1041, 1042-43 (D.D.C. 1971) (certify-
ing a Rule 23 class but silent on § 16(b)).
The Fair Labor Standards Act's provision for liquidated damages is limited by § 11 of the
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1976), which allows courts to deny liquidated
damages if an employer acted in good faith and had reasonable grounds for believing that it was
not violating the law. See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1976); Hodgson v. Miller Brewing Co., 457 F.2d 221 (7th Cir.
1972). Unlike other areas in which Title VII's remedies are somewhat more advantageous to a
plaintiff, this liquidated damages provision has no counterpart in Title VII.
Finally, the Fair Labor Standards Act, § 17, authorizes district courts to enjoin violations of
the Act or "the restraint of any withholding of... wages .. . found by the court to be due to
employees under this [Act]." 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1976). By comparison, Title VII gives courts a
blanket authorization to mandate any "equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
The courts have found additional differences in the remedies available under the EPA and
Title VII in the two areas of union contribution, Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers,
606 F.2d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (an employer has the right of union contribution under Title VII
but not under the EPA), and back pay, Dessenberg v. American Metal Forming Co., 6 FEP
Cas. 159 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (denying back pay for maternity leave as not lying within the EPA's
definition of wages).
10. Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to treat its employees differently on the
basis of sex, race, religion, color or national origin. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973). Similarly, the EPA prohibits employers from treating men and women
employees disparately by paying a person of one sex differently than one of the other sex when
both are doing equal work in the same establishment. But unlike the EPA, Title VII also
prohibits the adoption of policies or practices that have the effect of adversely affecting indi-
viduals of one sex or race, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), or of perpetuat-
ing the present effects of pre-Title VII discrimination. International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). Once the plaintiff proves a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion, the burden shifts to the employer to "articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason."
Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1979). The plaintiff can then
attempt to show that the articulated reason is pretextual. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. at 802. Finally, Title VII allows a very narrowly construed exception for situations in
which sex is a "bona fide occupational qualification." See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1979); Hodgson
v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 1264 (D. Del. 1971) (Title VII's bona fide occupa-
tional qualification not applicable to EPA cases).
11. Normally this problem arises in cases of alleged sex discrimination, but not always. See
Pattvrson v. Western Dev. Laboratories, 13 FEP Cas. 772 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (race discrimina-
tion).
12. The Bennett Amendment provides:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under [Title VII] for any employer
to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of ihe wages or
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links Title VII relief from wage discrimination to the EPA. Yet, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Gunther v. County of
Washington,13 effectively severed relief under the two statutes by strictly
construing the Bennett Amendment. In a case of first impression among the
courts of appeals, the Gunther court held that Title VII prohibits wage
disparities based on sex between dissimilar jobs.14 As a result, the Gunther
decision will permit Title VII plaintiffs to raise discriminatory wage claims by
comparing the value of diflerent jobs.
After briefly discussing the wage discrimination provisions of Title VII and
the EPA, and pre-Gunther case law concerning the relationship between
them, this Note dissects the Gunther court's opinion, and concludes that the
court misconstrued legislative intent, statutory language and agency inter-
pretations in achieving its result. Presenting an alternative judicial role for
resolving similar future claims, this Note further addresses the insidious ef-
fects that the Gunther decision may have both on the stability of the
employment market and on the long-run accomplishment of true employ-
ment equality for women.
BACKGROUND DISCUSSION
Although the United States Supreme Court has never expressly decided
whether Title VII's only wage discrimination yardstick is the equal pay for
equal work standard, the Gunther court's decision that Title VII need not
duplicate this EPA standard represents a significant departure from antece-
dent judicial pronouncements. At the outset, however, the provisions of
Title VII and of the EPA must be discussed.
Congress' first effort to abolish sex discrimination in wages, the EPA, con-
tains two basic clauses.15  The first sets forth the general rule: men and
women who perform "equal work" in the same establishment shall not re-
ceive unequal pay. 16 Equal work is defined as work requiring equal skill,
effort and responsibility under similar working conditions. 17 A plaintiff's
burden of showing equal work is met by proof that two jobs require sub-
stantially equal work, not necessarily identical work but not merely similar
compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such dif-
ferentiation is authorized by the provisions of [the EPA].
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
13. 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979).
14. 602 F.2d at 891. The term "dissimilar job" is used in this Note to denote jobs that are
neither equivalent nor substantially equivalent. It can be equated with the often-used, but
misleading, term "comparable job."
15. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
16. The statutory term is not pay; it is "wage rate." This is defined as overtime premiums
and all rates, whether calculated by time, piece, job, incentive, or otherwise. 29 C.F.R.
§ 800.106 (1979).
17. For a discussion of the meaning of these factors, see Sullivan, The Equal Pay Act of




work."' Moreover, in comparing job content 19 to show equal work, Con-
gress intended the measures of skill, effort, responsibility and working condi-
tions to be applied as terms of art in the job evaluation field. 20  The second
clause contains three particular exceptions and one catch-all exception to the
general rule.2 1  Specifically, it provides that wage gaps between the sexes
are not unlawful when based on a seniority, a merit, or a piece-work system,
or when based on any other factor other than sex. 2 2  After the plaintiff
proves both equal work and unequal pay, the burden shifts to the defendant
to justify the wage disparity with one of the Act's four exceptions as affirma-
tive defenses. 2 3
The same general congressional purpose that motivated the EPA also gave
rise to Title VII:24 to eradicate the deleterious effects of a long and well-
18. The "substantially equal work" standard was first fashioned in Shultz v. Wheaton Glass
Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970). The Wheaton Glass court recog-
nized that, on the one hand, a strict identical work requirement would effectively emasculate
the EPA's protection while, on the other hand, a comparable work standard was rejected by
Congress in favor of the equal work standard. Id. at 265. Thus, the court adopted the more.
moderate substantially equal standard, which was quickly embraced by other courts. See, e.g.,
Ridgeway v. United Hospital-Miller Div., 563 F.2d 923, 926 (8th Cir. 1977); Hodgson v. Miller
Brewing Co., 457 F.2d 221, 226 (7th Cir. 1972); Hodgson v. Fairmont Supply Co., 454 F.2d
490, 493 (4th Cir. 1972); Hodgson v. American Bank of Commerce, 447 F.2d 416, 419 (5th Cir.
1971). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has indicated that it approves of the substantially equal
standard. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 203 n.24 (1974). It is clear, however,
that some courts find jobs with more than inconsequential differences to be "substantially
equal." See, e.g., Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978) (female stewardesses and male pursers perform substantially equal
work despite divergent flight assignments, duties and responsibilities).
19. The term "job content" refers to the requirements of a job, the duties performed by the
employee and the conditions under which they are performed. See 29 C.F.R. § 800.109 (1979).
20. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. at 201-02. Thus, as the Supreme Court
noted "wage differentials based upon bona fide job evaluation plans would be outside the pur-
view of the Act." Id. at 201 (emphasis added). For a discussion of job evaluation plans, see
notes 117-32 and accompanying text infra.
21. Congress intended the first three exceptions-merit, seniority and piecework
systems-to be specific examples of situations where a pay differential is based on a "factor
other than sex" under the final exception. H.R. REP. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963);
Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976). See note 5 supra.
23. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195-96 (1974).
24. Specifically, the EPA "was intended as a broad charter of women's rights in the
economic field. It sought to overcome the age-old belief in women's inferiority and to eliminate
the depressing effects on living standards of reduced wages for female workers and the
economic and social consequences which flow from it." Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d
259, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970). See also Coming Glass Works v. Brennan,
417 U.S. at 195 (quoting S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963)). The declared purpose
of Congress in adopting the EPA was to end the following consequences of wage differentials
between the sexes: depressed living standards, poor utilization of human resources, tendency to
cause labor disputes, and unfair competition. The Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, §
2(a), 77 Stat. 56 (1963). See also H.R. REP. No. 1370, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) (evincing
Congress' concern with improper employment discrimination).
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documented history of employment discrimination against individuals
belonging to economically disadvantaged groups. 25 111 contrast to the EPA's
finely delineated provisions, Title. VII broadly prohibits discrimination
"against any individual with respect to his [or her] -compensation." 26  Al-
though it is not entirely clear what affect Title VII was intended to have on
the EPA,2 7 the United States Supreme Court once concluded that Title VII
was meant to "supplement rather than supplant existing laws ...relating to
discrimination."- 28  The Court's recent decision in City of Los Angeles De-
partment of Water & Power v. Manhart 29 is also somewhat instructive.
In Manhart, female employees challenged under Title VII their
employer's practice of deducting more for pension benefits from their pay
than from the pay of male employees. The employer argued that the dispar-
ate deductions were necessitated by the longer average lifespan of females,
which would ultimately require it to pay females larger pension benefits. 30
The employer firther contended that this practice was authorized by the
fourth exception in the EPA, namely, that the greater deduction was based
on longevity, a factor other than sex.31  Since the Court rejected this de-
fense, it did not reach the employer's contention that an EPA defense could
be asserted in this Title VII action because of the Bennett Amendment link
between the two acts. 3 2  Thus, the Court in Manhart did not decide
Title Vll's more comprehensive, but related purpose was "to achieve equality of employment
opportunity and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of
white [male] employees over other employees." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427
(1971). See Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971) (Title VII
puts men and women on equal footing).
25. See generally G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (1957). Wage dis-
parities are as old as the Bible: "[A] male between 20 and 60 years old shall be valued at 50
shekels .... If it is a female she shall be valued at 30 shekels." Leviticus 27:3-4. In spite of the
EPA, wonen in the United States still earn about two-thirds as much as men. S. POLACHEK,
DISCONTINUOUS LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND ITS EFFECT ON WOMEN'S MARKET
EARNINGS in C. LLOYD, SEx DISCRIMINATION AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR 90-122 (1975);
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOCIAL INDICATORS OF EQUALITY FOR MINORITIES AND
WOMEN 48-52 (1978). See also CONFERENCE ON ALTERNATE STATE AND LOCAL POLICY &
COMMITTEE ON PAY EQUITY, MANUAL ON PAY EQUITY (1980) (available by writing 2000
Florida Avenue N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
27. In fact, the Court has denied certiorari in cases that might have presented this question.
E.g., Brennan v. Prince William Hosp. Corp., 503 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 972 (1975); Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill & Sons, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 865 (1975).
28. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 (1974) (in the context of whether an
individual who pursues a discrimination claim through arbitration waives a right to seek Title
VII relief in federal court).
29. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
30. Id. at 712.
31. See note 5 supra.
32. The Court's discussion of the Bennett Amendment was very carefully limited to the
contentions of the parties. 435 U.S. at 711-13.
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whether the Bennett Amendment serves to incorporate the EPA's four ex-
ceptions into Title VII. Nevertheless, the decision could be interpreted as
necessarily concluding that the Bennett Amendment incorporates the EPA's
four defenses because the Court allowed the employer to assert one of those
defenses. 33 But even under this less persuasive interpretation, the Court
clearly did not decide whether the EPA's equal work standard also is incor-
porated.
34
Indeed, before the Ninth Circuit's decision in Gunther, no circuit court
had expressly decided whether Title VII plaintiffs could bring claims predi-
cated only on the EPA's equal pay for equal work principle. 35  There were,
however, some vague indications of how the appeals courts regarded the
interplay between Title VII and the EPA. Some courts have treated each
statute as helpful in interpreting the other. 36 Many circuits, following dicta
33. 435 U.S. at 712. An interpretation of Manhart suggesting that the Supreme Court did
decide whether the EPA's four exceptions are incorporated into Title VII is possible because the
Court affirmed the court of appeals decision which stated that "all that the Bennett Amendment
did was incorporate the exemptions of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII." Manhart v. City of Los
Angeles Dep't of Power & Water, 553 F.2d 581, 590 (9th Cir. 1977). Similar language is not,
however, found in the majority's affirmance. Cf. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Power & Water
v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 727 (1978) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("the exemption provided by the
Equal Pay Act .... is incorporated into Title VII"). Nevertheless, in Gunther the Ninth Circuit
relied upon its previous decision in Manhart as support. 602 F.2d at 890.
34. While pay level usually depends on job content, pension benefits are commonly deter-
mined by multiplying an employee's years of service by a percentage of an employee's average
earnings. Staats, Private Pension Plans: How Benefits Are Computed, MANAGEMENT REV. 33-36
(No. 10, 1965). Thus, there is no assurance that two employees performing identical jobs would
be assessed the same pension deduction. Because there was no question in Manhart whether
the male and female employees were performing equal work, the Court was not presented with
this incorporation question. Similarly, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976),
the issue was whether a disability plan discriminated against women by failing to provide preg-
nancy coverage; there was no question whether women and men performed equal work.
35. Although it is true, as the Gunther court asserted, that no circuit court ever expressly
discussed the incorporation issue, id. at 888, several decisions are incomprehensible unless they
impliedly decided that Title VII does incorporate the EPA's equal pay for equal work prin-
ciple. See Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 15 FEP Cas. 914 (W.D.N.C. 1976), aff'd, 15
FEP Cas. 925 (4th Cir. 1977) (court applied only the EPA's equal pay for equal work standard
to a Title VII claim not so confined); Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117, 119-20 (10th Cir. 1971)
(same). Every district court considering the link between Title VII and the EPA has decided
that Title VII is coextensive with the EPA. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 449 F. Supp.
397 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Molthan v. Temple University, 442 F. Supp. 448 (E.D. Pa. 1977); How-
ard v. Ward County, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5790 (D.N.D. 1976). Other courts have considered
the question only when presented with a Title VII claim solely alleging unequal pay for equal
work. See cases cited in note 43 infra.
36. Hays v. Potlach Forests, Inc., 465 F.2d 1081, 1083 (8th Cir. 1972) (EPA helpful in
interpreting Title VII); Hodgson v. Corning Glass Works, 330 F. Supp. 46, 49-50 (W.D.N.Y.
1971) (Title VII helpful in interpreting the EPA), aff'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 226 (2d Cir.
1973), aff'd sub nom. Brennan v. Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. 188 (1974). This result is, of
course, consistent with the view that the two statutes are in pari matera. See also Coming
Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 209-10 (1974) (an EPA case, citing Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971), a Title VII case, with the cf. signal).
1980]
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in the first important EPA case, Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 3 7 have de-
clared that Title VII and the EPA must be construed harmoniously to
achieve Congress' purpose.38 At a minimum, this rule of construction re-
quires that EPA standards be applied to Title VII claims of unequal pay for
equal work. 39 A serious problem remains: whether a plaintiff may allege
wage discrimination under Title VII grounded on a theory other than equal
pay for equal work.
Decisions preceding Gunther clearly indicate that Title VII's facially
broader prohibition of sex discrimination in wages must be restrained in ap-
plication to achieve amity with the EPA. For example, in Christensen v.
Iowa,4 0 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that when Title VII
plaintiffs fail to prove that two jobs are substantially equal they may not
attempt to prove sex bias by showing that dissimilar jobs are of equal
value.4 1  Although this court did not directly address the role played by the
EPA in a Title VII case, 42 its decision implies that the only way Title VII
plaintiffs may prove sex discrimination in wages by comparing two jobs is by
comparing the content of the two jobs, i.e., by showing equal work. In Lem-
ons v. City & County of Denver,43 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
37. 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
38. Wheaton Glass has been cited and followed by several circuits: Di Salvo v. Chamber of
Commerce of Greater Kansas City, 568 F.2d 593, 596 (8th Cir. 1978); Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill
& Sons, Inc., 511 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); Ammons v. Zia
Co., 448 F.2d 117, 119 (10th Cir. 1971). But because these courts typically cite each other with
little independent analysis, it is important to note exactly what the Wheaton Glass court said:
Although the Civil Rights Act is much broader than the Equal Pay Act, its provision
regarding discrimination based on sex are in pari materia with the Equal Pay Act.
This is recognized in the provisions of § 703(h) [the Bennett Amendment]....
Since both statutes serve the same fundamental purpose against discrimination
based on sex, the Equal Pay Act may not be construed in a manner which by virtue
of § 703(h) would undermine the Civil Rights Act.
It is not necessary here, however, to delineate the precise manner in which these
two statutes must be harmonized to work together in semvice of the underlying
Congressional objective.
421 F.2d at 266.
39. See Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882, 891 (9th Cir. 1979); Di Salvo v.
Chamber of Commerce of Greater Kansas City, 568 F.2d 593, 596 (8th Cir. 1978); Orr v. Frank
R. MacNeill & Sons, Inc., 511 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975).
40. 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
41. id. at 356.
42. Although the Eighth Circuit declined to decide the Bennett Amendment issue in Chris-
tensen, it did decide that a prima facie case of Title VII discrimination is not established by
showing merely that two differently paid, dissimilar jobs are equally valued by an employer. Id.
at 355 n.5. The court adamantly refused to "interpret Title VII as requiring an employer to
ignore the market in setting wage rates for genuinely different work classifications." Id. at 356.
Accord, Lemons v. City & County of Denver, No. 78-1499 (10th Cir. 1980); Brennan v. Prince
William Hosp. Corp., 503 F.2d 282, 285 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975);
Hodgson v. Miller Brewing Co., 457 F.2d 221, 227 (7th Cir. 1972); Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne
College, 15 FEP Cas. 914, 924 (W.D.N.C. 1976), aff'd, 15 FEP Cas. 925 (4th Cir. 1977).
43. No. 78-1499 (10th Cir. 1980). The appeals court observed that the plaintiffs were "not
seeking equality of opportunity in skills as contemplated by Title VII . . . but instead would
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cuit did not merely imply this result, it expressly held that Title VII is coex-
tensive with the EPA, and hence Title VII plaintiffs who complain that they
are paid less than employees of the opposite sex may only prevail by show-
ing equal work. While Lemons was decided after Gunther, the pre-Gunther
courts also refused to allow plaintiffs to circumvent the EPA by using Title
VII to compare the value of dissimilar jobs.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
In 1973, the County of Washington (Oregon) employed female "matrons"
to supervise its female prisoners and male guards to supervise its male in-
mates.4 4 Each guard managed about twelve times as many prisoners as
each matron. 4 5 Moreover, the County employed more matrons than
needed to guard the few female prisoners, and thus the matrons spent about
fifty percent of their working hours doing clerical work not done by the male
guards. 46
Upon their dismissal,4 7 four of the matrons brought suit under section
703(a)(1) of Title VII, alleging, inter alia,4a that during their employ the
County had denied them equal pay for work substantially equal to the
guard's work.4 9 The district court held that the County had not violated
cross job description lines into areas of entirely different skills. This would be a whole new
world for the courts, and until some better signal from Congress is received, we cannot venture
into it." See also IUE v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 19 FEP Cas. 450 (D.N.J. 1979); Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Colby College, 439 F. Supp. 631, 634-35 (D. Me. 1977),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 589 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1978); Wetzel v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 449 F. Supp. 397 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Molthan v. Temple University, 442 F. Supp.
448 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
44. 602 F.2d at 886. In mid-1973, male guards, who were temporarily assigned deputy
sheriffs, were replaced by corrections officers, a position open to both men and women. Id.
45. Three matrons were employed for each prisoner. Id. at 887.
46. Id. at 888.
47. Their dismissal was apparently the aggravating cause in their initiation of this suit, al-
though it is irrelevant to the wage discrimination issues.
48. The matrons also alleged that the County had violated § 704(a) of Title VII by retaliating
against them for asserting their right to equal pay for equal work. Id. at 885. The court held
that the County did not violate Title VII because (1) the County had eliminated the matrons'
jobs for the "legitimate, nondiscriminatory" purpose of reducing overcrowding and saving
money, id. at 892; (2) the County refused to rehire one plaintiff because of her poor health, id.
at 893; and (3) no connection was shown between the matrons' assertion of their civil rights and
a no-rehire notation made in their personnel files. Id. For a discussion of Title VII law relating
to retaliation claims, see SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 1, at 416-41.
49. The male guards were classified as deputy sheriffs and deputy sheriff recruits until June
1973 when the county replaced them with correction officers and correction officer trainees. 602
F.2d at 886. In 1973, the salary ranges for these positions were as follows:
Deputy Correction
Sheriff D.S. Recruit Officers C.O. Trainee
$736-$940 $668-$812 $701-$896 $668-$812
Matron $525-$668 $525-$668 $525-$668 $525-$668
Differential $211-$272 $143-$144 $176-$228 $143-$144
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Title VII by paying the matrons less than guards because a matron's job
required less effort and responsibility. 50  In addition, the lower court held
that this decision on the equal work issue ended its inquiry, and therefore it
refused to hear the plaintiffs' contention that, even if the two jobs were not
substantially equal, sex bias alone caused some of the pay gap. 5 '
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
the matrons argued that job differences in the number of prisoners guarded
were not significant because a supervisor must be present whether the jail
contained one or ten prisoners. They further contended that job differences
in the amount of clerical work done were not important because they merely
did clerical work rather than sit idle. 52  The court of appeals disagreed,
affirming as not clearly erroneous the lower court's decision that the two jobs
were not substantially equal. 53 Nevertheless, the court remanded the case
to allow the plaintiffs a chance to prove that sex discrimination had caused
some of the wage differential. 54
THE ISSUE AND THE DECISION
If the matrons had brought suit under the EPA, 55 a decision that their job
and the guards' job were dissimilar would have ended the inquiry because
that statute only prohibits wage gaps between equal jobs. 56 Since the suit
was brought under Title VII, the Gunther court framed the issue as whether
Title VII is broader in scope than the EPA. 57  Unfortunately, this statement
of the issue is so general that it serves to obscure rather than to clarify the
actual decision in Gunther. The issue is better stated as whether Title VII's
broad language 5 8 is narrowed by the EPA so that Title VII plaintiffs, trying
50. Id. at 888. The fundamentally subjective nature of job comparisons under the equal
work principle is underscored by the district court's and Ninth Circuit's assertion that "clerical
work entails substantially less effort . . . than guarding prisoners." Id. The court did not, how-
ever, fully discuss how it reached this deceptively simple conclusion. Effort could be measured
by the expenditure of physical effort or energy, by mental fatigue, or by an amalgam thereof. If
effort is measured by mental fatigue, it becomes more difficult to conclude summarily that
clerical work requires less effort. Choosing between these proxy variables and defending with
solid evidence the conclusion that one job requires less effort than another undoubtedly coinpli-
cates the task. See generally A. LANGSNER & H. ZOLLTsCH, WAGE AND SALARY ADMINIS-
TRATION 203 (1961) [hereinafter cited as LANGSNER & ZOLLITSCH].
51. 602 F.2d at 886.
52. Petitioner's Brief at 28, Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979).
53. 602 F.22d at 887.
54. Id. at 891.
55. The matrons brought suit under Title VII alone because the EPA did not apply to local
governments until May 1, 1974 (The Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-259, § 1(a), 88 Stat. 55 (1974)), several months after the matrons were discharged. 602
F.2d at 886 n.4.
56. See, e.g., Brennan v. Prince William Hosp. Corp., 503 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975).
57. 602 F.2d at 888.
58. See note 7 supra.
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to prove sex discrimination in wages by comparing two jobs, may only com-
pare jobs that are substantially equal. In explanation, the matrons did not
present evidence that they would have been paid more if they were male
despite what other male or female employees were paid. Rather, their proof
was that because male guards were paid more, sex must have been a factor
in setting their wages. 59  An EPA analysis would gauge the strength of this
inference by comparing the content of the two jobs, and a presumption 60
would arise that sex discrimination did indeed cause the wage gap when the
jobs' contents are substantially equal. Moreover, the EPA only envisions a
situation in which plaintiffs use job comparisons to infer discrimination, as
manifested in the Act's comparison-based formula of equal pay for equal
work. 6 1 When a plaintiff's evidence does not include job comparisons, there-
fore, the Equal Pay Act has no application. 62
The matrons' suit was initiated, however, under Title VII and not under
the EPA. Title VII, without relying on a comparison-based formula, makes
sex discrimination in compensation unlawful. 63  For example, Title VII pro-
hibits sex discrimination in wages when the plaintiff's job is unique while
the EPA does not because in such a case no jobs can be compared. 64
Clearly, then, Title VII reaches farther than the EPA when an inference of
sex discrimination in wages does not depend upon job comparisons. Hence,
the question presented in Gunther was not, as the court indicated, simply
whether Title VII is broader than the EPA-in some cases it clearly is. The
more subtle question was whether Title VII also reaches claims not covered
by the EPA when those claims are based on job comparisons, or whether
the EPA's comparison-based formula is the only one Congress intended to
allow.
Without sufficiently explaining why the EPA's approach to male-female
pay disparities was not relevant, the Gunther court declined to curb Title
VII's broad scope and remedial purposes without evidence of a clear legisla-
tive intent suggesting that Title VII was to incorporate the EPA's relatively
59. 602 F.2d at 886.
60. The courts have never expressed it as a presumption; technically, this proof establishes a
prima facie case. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195-96 (1974). It is, however,
convenient for analytic purposes to think of it in these terms. Arguably, the absence of equal
content between two jobs raises the reverse presumption, that job content rather than sex
differences caused the wage differential. In other words, unequal pay for equal work between
the sexes is presumptively caused by sex discrimination while unequal pay for unequal work is
presumptively caused by variant job content.
61. See S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963) ("[job] comparisons can be ... put
to the practical end of administering a Federal equal pay policy").
62. See Rinkel v. Associated Pipeline Contractors, 17 FEP Cas. 224, 226 (D. Alaska 1978).
63. Title VII expansively proscribes any sex discrimination in compensation without restrict-
ing its protection to a particular method of proof. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). For the text of
this section, see note 7 supra.
64. Rinkel v. Associated Pipeline Contractors, 17 FEP Cas. 224, 226 (D. Alaska 1978). The
Wage and Hour Administrator's interpretive regulations, although of limited authority, General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 144 (1976); Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944),
also reach this conclusion. 29 C.F.R. § 800.108 (1979).
19801
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
limited equal pay for equal work standard. 65 It divined no such purpose
from section 703(h) of Title VII, the Bennett Amendment, which provides
that compensation differentials authorized by the EPA are not unlawful
under Title VII. 6 6 Focusing briefly on selected bits of legislative history,
the court concluded that Congress only intended the Bennett Amendment to
make the EPA's four exceptions available to employers as affirmative de-
fenses in Title VII suits for sex discrimination in wages. 67  It found contrary
district court authority unpersuasive 68 and construed agency regulations to
be consistent with its conclusion.6 9  The court reasoned that Title VII
creates rights independent of other statutes, and if Title VII's protection
were restricted to EPA claims of unequal pay for equal work, then other
harmful practices would be immunized from attack. Therefore, the Gunther
court held that a Title VII plaintiff is not confined to the claim of unequal
pay for equal work.
70
Having decided that Title VII is broader than the EPA, the Gunther court
proceeded to establish the precise protection afforded by the two statutes. It
held that, by virtue of the Bennett Amendment, the EPA's exceptions are
available as affirmative defenses in Title VII actions, and that a claim based
on job comparisons, but not alleging equal work, is permissible under Title
VII. 7 1 Stated differently, the court held that a Title VII plaintiff who fails to
prove that two jobs are equivalent may still compare the wages of these
dissimilar jobs to prove sex bias. Moreover, the decision permits plaintiffs to
rely, as the Gunther plaintiffs relied, 72 on evidence that shows the value of
65. 602 F.2d at 890.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 889. In its summary, the court stated its newly fashioned standard as allowing
plaintiffs to attack discriminatory practices other than equal pay for equal work "unless" an
exception applies. Id. at 891. But the more likely interpretation of the Gunther court's alloca-
tion of the burden of proof is that the defendant, not the plaintiff, has the burden of showing
the applicability of an exception as an affirmative defense.
68. Id. at 891. The court cited IUE v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 19 FEP Cas. 450
(D.N.J. 1979), Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 449 F. Supp. 397 (W.D. Pa. 1978), and
Molthan v. Temple University, 442 F. Supp. 448 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
69. 602 F.2d at 890.
70. Id. at 890-91.
71. Id. In the court's words, "although decisions interpreting the Equal Pay Act are au-
thoritative where a plaintiff suing under Title VII raises a claim of equal pay, plaintiffs are not
precluded from suing under Title VII to protest other discriminatory compensation practices."
id.
72. Petitioner's Brief at 29-30. Specifically, the matrons asserted:
[C]omparisons among the salary ranges show that the matrons salary levels make no
sense in relation to other salaries. . . .If the County considers policemen inherently
more valuable, why are corrections officers' salaries 'higher than deputies? If ma-
trons are worth less than corrections officers because they do some clerical work,
why are they paid 48% less than corrections officers and only slightly more than
police stenographers, whose work was 98% clerical? How can corrections officers
trainees, who have no experience at all, be more valuable than matrons with an




their job vis-a-vis the value of entirely different jobs held by employees of
the opposite gender. Because a pay gap between dissimilar jobs will be
partly, if not entirely, attributable to different job content and not to sex
discrimination, 7 3 the Gunther court also held that a plaintiff's claim that sex
bias caused the entire wage differential Will be judged under the EPA's
content-comparison principle. 74  In short, Gunther begets a new judicial
Title VII wage discrimination standard-comparable pay for work of com-
parable value 75-a standard that may, for the first time, significantly under-
cut economic market evaluations of a job's worth. 76
INFIRMITIES OF GUNTHER
The Gunther court's conclusion that the EPA's equal pay for equal work
standard is not incorporated into Title VII rests upon weak foundations. The
court's construction of the Bennett Amendment contorted that amendment's
language, relied imprudently upon selected bits of legislative history and
slighted the importance of policies underlying the EPA. In addition, the
court questionably interpreted Equal Employment Opportunity Commission-
regulations to avoid an agency position in conflict with its decision. The
Gunther court, in brief, erroneously concluded that the EPA is not the only
statutory basis for wage discrimination suits that use job comparisons as
proof of sex bias.
Although the court promised a "close analysis," 77 its consideration of the
Bennett Amendment was dissappointingly superficial. Clearly, courts may
seek the legislature's meaning outside the language of a statute; however,
they still should be confined by the words Congress carefully chooses in
expressing its will. 78 The Bennett Amendment provides that it is not unlaw-
73. The matrons alleged only that "some of the discrepancy in wages was due to sex dis-
crimination." 602 F.2d at 888 (emphasis added).
74. The Gunther court apparently distinguished "the Equal Pay Act's equal work formula,"
id. at 889, from "its equal pay formula." Id. at 890. Therefore, although the decision's use of
"equal pay" could be seen as shorthand for the phrase equal pay for equal work, the better
interpretation is that the court meant what is said: "Equal Pay Act Standards apply in Title VII
suits when the plaintiffs raise a claim of equal pay." Id. at 891 (emphasis added).
75. Although the court did not discuss this standard relying on proof of job value, it made
clear that "problems of proof ... are not sufficient reasons to foreclose" a Title VII claim of
wage discrimination. Id. at 891.
76. See notes 137-145 and accompanying text infra.
77. 602 F.2d at 889.
78. See generally Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REv. 527, 543 (1947). Of course, courts should not make "a fortress out of the dictionary."
Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945); Addison v. Holly
Hill Fruit Prods., :322 U.S. 607, 617 (1944) ("we should not stifle a policy by a pendantic or
grudging process of construction"); United States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143 (1905)
(Holmes, J,) ("[Tihe general purpose is a more important aid to [a statute's] meaning than any
rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down"). Yet, in the case of the Bennett Amend-
ment, the language used becomes critical because any legislative history that might clearly illu-
minate Congress' intent is lacking. See note 86 infra.
1980]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
ful under Title VII "to differentiate upon the basis of sex ... in wages or
compensation . . . if such differentiation is authorized by the [EPA]." 79
The problem presented by this language is in deciding what Congress meant
by the word "authorized." This problem arises because, on its face, the EPA
does not authorize employers to undertake any conduct. Rather, the EPA
prohibits employers from paying men and women doing the same job tun-
equal wages, except that it does not prohibit wage differentials when a factor
other than sex is responsible for the differential. " Yet, the Gunther court
held that the EPA exceptions, which are not prohibited, are incorporated
into Title VII.81 To be incorporated by the Bennett Amendment a practice
must, however, be authorized, and hence the court apparently equated "au-
thorized" with "not prohibited." 8 2  Strictly speaking, when a course of con-
duct is "not prohibited," it is not authorized; it is merely allowed. 83 But the
EPA also allows (or does "not prohibit"), because it does not address, wage
differences between unequal jobs, which should, thus, also have been consi-
dered authorized such that the Bennett Amendment would incorporate the
equal pay for equal work standard.84 If, as it aplie'ars, the court construed
the term authorized to mean not prohibited, then by refusing to hold also
that the EPA's equal pay for equal work standard is incorporated, the court
has garbled the meaning of the word "authorized"--the word Congress used
to express its intent.
Ignoring its semantic contortion of' the word authorized, the Gunther
court relied upon the Bennett Amendment's legislative history in its partial
incorporation decision.85 Specifically, the court examined the floor com-
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976) (emphasis added).
80. The EPA provides that "[n]o employer ...shall discriminate ...on the basis of sex by
paying [different] wages ... for equal work ...except where ... a differential [is] based on
any ... factor other than sex." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
81. 602 F.2d at 889.
82. Another court has apparently adopted the construction that "authorize" means "not
prohibited." See Molthan v. Temple University, 442 F. Supp. 448, 454 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (Title
VII only prohibits those claims that "run afoul of" the EPA).
83. The specific meanings of the terms "authorize" and "allow" become important because
statutory words are normally to be construed in their ordinary meaning. 2A SUTHERLAND,
STATUTORY CONSTRucTION § 46.01 (4th ed. 1973). The word authorized is commonly under-
stood to mean to affirmatively and formally empower conduct. See THE RANDOM HOUSE DiC-
TIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 100 (unabridged ed. 1973). However, "allow" denotes
the lack of any attempt or intent to hinder or encourage. Id. at 40. Thus, when a practice is not
prohibited it is allowed but not necessarily authorized.
84. It is true, however, that the EPA expressly allows wage differentials when they are not
based on sex and that it can only be said to allow wage differentials between different jobs
because it does not address this issue. While there is no significant conceptual difference be-
tween Congress allowing an action by not addressing it and allowing an action expressly, it may
be dangerous to infer too much from congressional silence. Yet, the EPA Congress expressly
rejected a standard that would have allowed equal pay disputes between different jobs. See note
104 infra. Thus, this is not so much a case of congressional silence as a case of conscious
congressional inaction.
85. 602 F.2d at 889-90.
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ments of Senator Bennett,8 6 who introduced the amendment as a "technical
correction" 87 "to provide that in the event of conflicts [between Title VII
and the EPA] the provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be nullified."" 8
Although it is not completely clear what conflicts the Senator had in mind at
this time,8 9 he explained that the eleventh-hour insertion of the word "sex"
86. 110 CONG. REC. 13,647 (1964). The entire "debate" preceding the Bennett Amend-
ment's adoption occurred within about three minutes. It follows in full:
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, after many years of yearning by members of the
fair sex in this country, and after very careful study by the appropriate committees
of Congress, last year Congress passed the so-called Equal Pay Act, which became
effective only yesterday.
By this time, programs have been established for the effective administration of
this act. Now, when the civil rights bill is under consideration, in which the word
"sex" has been inserted in many places, I do not believe sufficient attention may
have been paid to possible conflicts between the wholesale insertion of the word
"sex" in the bill and in the Equal Pay Act.
The purpose of my amendment is to provide that in the event of conflicts, the
provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be nullified.
I understand that the leadership in charge of the bill have agreed to the amend-
ment as a proper technical correction of the bill. If they will confirm that under-
stand [sic], I shall ask that the amendment be voted on without asking for the yeas
and nays.
Mr. HUMPHREY. The amendment of the Senator from Utah is helpful. I believe
that it is needed. I thank him for his thoughtfulness. The amendment is fully ac-
ceptable.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute.
We were aware of the conflict that might develop, because the Equal Pay Act was
an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Fair Labor Standards Act
carries out certain exceptions.
All that the pending anwndment does is recognize those exceptions, that are car-
ried in the basic act.
Therefore, this amendment is necessary, in the interest of clarification.
Id. (emphasis added).
87. Some have implied that a technical correction should not be given the substantive effect
of restricting the scope of Title VII. See 111 CONG. RC. 18,263 (1965) (reprinting a letter
written to the chairperson of the Equal Employment Opportunity Committee); Blumrosen,
Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 J.L.
REF. 397, 481 (1979). The contrary view is that the amendment was properly classified as a
technical amendment because it confirmed a previous understanding of Title VII. See 110
CONG. REC. 7,217 (1964) (remarks of Senator Clark). One court, however, has deemed this
issue unimportant. IUE v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 19 FEP Cas. 450, 455 n.16 (D.N.J.
1979).
88. See note 86 supra.
89. This ambiguity was noted very shortly. after Title VII was enacted. See Berg, Equal
Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLYN L. REV. 62, 75
(1964-65).
One year later, Senator Bennett clarified his understanding of his amendment's effect during
a colloquy with Senator Dirksen. *Senator Bennett stated that "the amendment means that dis-
crimination in compensation on account of sex does not violate Title VII unless it also violates
the Equal Pay Act." 111 CONG. REC. 13,360 (1965). Senator Dirksen responded that the
amendment was accepted "on the basis of the intent which was in the mind of the Senator from
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into Title VII motivated his amendment. 90 Because both Title VII and the
EPA would now protect against sex discrimination, *Senator Bennett's coin-
ment indicates that he was concerned about any conflict arising between the
two statutes, not merely conflicts arising if the EPA's four affirmative de-
fenses were not available in a Title VII case, the Gunther court's opinion
notwithstanding. 91 Furthermore, since Title VII already included language
nearly identical to the EPA's four exceptions at the time he proposed his
amendment, 92 it does not seem particularly likely that Senator Bennett was
concerned with ensuring that employers could employ the four EPA excep-
tions in Title VII cases. Rather, he must have intended that any conflict
between the EPA and Title VII be resolved under the EPA's standards.
Contrary to the Gunther court's conclusion, 93 when a Title VII claim relies
on job comparisons other than the job content comparisons specified in the
EPA, a conflict does arise between the two acts. 94 Thus, in these cases, the
EPA alone should control.
After relying, albeit inappropriately, on Senator Bennett's remarks, 95 the
Utah [Bennett] when he submitted the amendment." ld." Shortly thereafter, Senator Clark pro-
tested Senator Bennett's attempt to create legislative history after the fact. Id. at 18,263.
90. An amendment to add "sex" to Title VII was proposed and accepted from the House
floor. 110 CONG. REC. 2,577-84 (1964). Thus, the legislative history behind the sex discrimina-
tion provision of Title VII is "notable primarily for its brevity." General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976).
91. 602 F.2d at 889-90.
92. The Bennett Amendment was offered on June 12, 1964. As early as June 4, the Senate
had amended the bill containing Title VII to allow for the exceptions contained in § 703(h) other
than the Bennett Amendment. 110 CONG. REC. 12,723 (1964).
Section 703(h) of Title VII provides that it is not unlawful for employers "to apply different
standards of compensation . . . pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system
which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production ... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)
(1976). This language duplicates the EPA's first three exceptions, with the sole difference being
the "bona fide" qualifier. But it is inconceivable that Congress intended less than bona fide
systems to justify a wage differential under the EPA. See S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1963) (seniority systems are exceptions "provided they are based on tenure and not
upon sex"). The EPA's fourth exception merely clarifies something implicit in the Act's major
provision: that there is no discrimination because of sex in wages if a wage differential is not
based on sex. Id. Thus, if Senator Bennett thought his amendment made Title VlI's protection
coextensive with the EPA's protection, he would not be concerned with the availability of the
EPA's exceptions in Title VII cases. But even if he was, there is certainly no indication that this
was his sole concern.
93. The Gunther court reasoned that "[w]hen plaintiffs raise a claim nnder Title VII of
discriminatory compensation in the absence of an allegation that they perform substantially
equal work, no conflict with the Equal Pay Act arises because the Equal Pay Act is inapplica-
ble." 602 F.2d at 891.
94. See notes 100-107 and accompanying text infra.
95. Not only did the Gunther court erroneously interpret Senator Bennett's remarks, it also
baldly asserted that Senator Dirksen's comments were "to the same effect." 602 F.2d at 890.
But Senator Dirksen's statement does not deal with the availability of the EPA's defenses under
Title VI1. Although he was concerned with the particular conflict between the two acts that
might arise "because" the EPA amended the Fair Labor Standards Act, he referred to "excep-
tions" carried out by the Fair Labor Standards Act, most likely referring to § 13 of that Act,
which exempts certain employers and employees from coverage.
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Gunther court put the Congressional record aside. It either missed or ig-
nored the statement of Congressman Celler, who had described the various
amendments the Senate had made to the original House bill. 96 The Con-
gressman explained that the Bennett Amendment made employer com-
pliance with the EPA the sole requirement of Title VII in the area of sex
discrimination in wages. 97 After the Congressman made this statement, and
with no intervening explanations of the Bennett Amendment, the House
passed Title VII.98  Thus, the only comments from the House indicate that
the House understood Title VII to incorporate all the provisions of the
EPA-including the equal work requirement. Surely, this slice of legislative
history should have played a part in the Gunther court's search for Congress'
intent.
A further significant flaw in the Gunther court's construction of Title VII is
its failure to discuss why the specific expression of Congress' purpose em-
bodied in the EPA is subordinate to the vague intent expressed by Title VII.
Although statutes with remedial purposes are to be construed liberally, 99 the
Gunther court apparently adopted and applied a principle of construing an
extensively remedial statute, Title VII, in a broader fashion than a related
but more precise remedial statute, the EPA. 10 0 Even if the court were
candid in announcing it, this approach is contrary to established views of
statutory construction. When two statutes overlap, as do Title VII and the
EPA, the most reliable expression of the legislature's intent is found in the
statute that evidences the most precision,10 1 regardless of the order of their
enactment. 10 2 The remedial purpose of Title VII is to end all discrimination
in private industry's employment policies or practices. The EPA's remedial
96. 110 CONG. REC. 15,896 (1964). Title VII originated as House Bill 7152, was amended in
the Senate by Senate substitute amendment No. 656, and was returned to the House, at which
point Congressman Celler explained the Senate's amendments. Explaining the Bennett
Amendment he stated: "The Senate amendment also ... [p]rovides that compliance with the
[EPA] satisfies the requirement of [Title VII] barring discrimination because of sex-section




99. See, e.g., Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 208 (1974) ("The Equal Pay
Act is broadly remedial, and it should be construed and applied so as to fulfill the underlying
purposes which Congress sought to achieve").
100. The Gunther court did not explain its approach; however, its analysis may prove the
assertion that in "matters of statutory construction . . . it makes a great deal of difference
whether you start with an answer or with a problem." Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the
Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 529 (1947).
101. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-500 (1973) (applying rule to restrict a broadly
remedial statute); Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1957);
Clifford F, MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 102, 107 (1944); D. Ginsberg & Sons v.
Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932); Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41,
46-49 (1928); American Medical Ass'n v. Mathews, 429 F. Supp. 1179, 1196 (N.D. I11. 1977).
102. Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 753, 758 (1961); Abell v. United States,
518 F.2d 1369, 1378 (Ct. Cl, 1975); Panama Canal Co. v. Anderson, 312 F.2d 98, 100-01 (5th
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purpose, on the other hand, is to strike a balance between ending sex dis-
crimination in wages while preserving maximum discretion in employers and
employees to decide the economic worth, the wage, of' the employees'
jobs. 1 3 The EPA simply mandates that once the relative value of dissimilar
jobs is established, all employees in the same jobs shall receive the wage
reflecting that job value, regardless of sex. Furthermore, the same Congress
that enacted the EPA rejected a standard of equal pay for "comparable
work" to ensure that courts did not meddle with the private sector's job-
value decisions. 104 This policy of limiting incursions into thewage market is
even more critical when two jobs are dissimilar. 1 0 5  The Gunther decision,
by holding that equal work need not be shown in a claim under Title VII, 10 6
ignores this delicate balance established by the EPA in favor of Title VII's
amorphous approach, even though there is no evidence that the Title VII
Congress intended to alter the previous legislative policy and allow courts to
interfere with job value decisions by comparing the relative value of dissimi-
lar jobs. 10 7
While the court cursorily examined, and incorrectly construed, the Ben-
nett Amendment's language and legislative history, it exactingly construed
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) determination of
congressional intent. 10 8 In a 1965 regulation, the EEOC, the delegated au-
thority to administer Title VII, 10 9 concluded that the Bennett Amendment
made the EPA's equal pay for equal work standard "applicable to Title
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 832 (1963). As the Court stated in Radzanower v. Touche Ross &
Co., 426 U.S. 148 (1976): "It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a statute dealing
with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering
a more generalized spectrum." 1d. at 153.
103. See note 104 infra.
104. 109 CONG. REC. 9,198 (1963) (colloquy between Congressman Goodell and Congress-
woman Griffin). See HousE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 88rH CONG., IST SESS.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963 (Comm. Print 1963); Shultz v.
Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970). Courts deciding
EPA claims have recognized the limitations Congress placed upon their authority. As one
court said, Congress did not authorize "the courts to engage in wholesale reevaluation of an
employer's pay structure, in order to enforce their own conceptions of economic worth." Bren-
nan v. Prince William Hosp. Corp., 503 F.2d 282, 285 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
972 (1975). See also Hodgson v. Corning Glass Works, 474 F.2d 226, 231 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd
on other grounds sub noin. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974) ("Congress
did not intend to put . . . the courts in the business of evaluating jobs and determining what
constitutes a proper differential for unequal work").
105. See notes 133-149 and accompanying text infra.
106. 602 F.22d at 891.
107. See Lemons v. City & County of Denver, No. 78-1499 (10th Cir. 1980) (court adopted
approach requiring evidence of Congress' intent to expand the Equal Pay Act's policy through
Title VII); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 449 F. Supp. 397, 400-01 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (same).
Cf Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d at 890 (court required evidence of Congress'
intent to restrain Title VlI's broad reach).
108. 602 F.2d at 891.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2 000g (1976).
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VII. ' ' 110 The Gunther court could fail to find this regulation inconsistent
with its decision to extend Title VII further than the EPA only by strictly
construing it to mean that the equal work standard is applicable in Title VII
cases, but not exclusively. 1 1' If the regulation is read in context, it clearly
seems that the EEOC determined that the only aspect of the EPA not in-
corporated into Title VII was the scope of the EPA's employer coverage. 112
Finally, the court contended that if it were to limit Title VII's scope to the
discriminatory wage practices prohibited by the EPA, it would shield
"other" discriminatory practices from judicial review. 113  As examples of
these practices, the court cited cases in which the plaintiff's job was unique,
but where sex discrimination in wages could be shown without demonstrat-
ing substantially equal work 1 14 or without using job comparisons at all. 115 A
different holding, one more aligned with the policy Congress established in
the EPA of limiting the government's intrusion into the wage market, would
110. 30 Fed. Reg. 14,927 (1965) (formerly codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7). The regulation
provided, in part:
§ 1604.7. Relationship of Title VII to the Equal Pay Act. (a) Title VII requires that
its provisions be harmonized with the Equal Pay Act [§ 206(d)] in order to avoid
conflicting interpretations or requirements with respect to situations to which both
statutes are applicable. Accordingly, the Commission interprets section 703(h) [the
Bennett Amendment] to mean that the standards of "equal pay for equal work" set
forth in the Equal Pay Act for determining what is unlawful discrimination in com-
pensation are applicable to Title VII. However, it is the judgement of the Commis-
sion that the employee coverage of the prohibition against discrimination in compen-
sation because of sex is coextensive with that of the other prohibitions in section
703, and is not limited by section 703(h) to those employees covered by the Fair
Labor Standards Act.
Id. (emphasis added).
111. But again, the Gunther court failed to explain its reasoning, preferring summary conclu-
sions instead. See 602 F.2d at 891.
112. See note 110 supra. The EEOC has since modified its position "to the extent that . . .
prior [EEOC] pronouncements are inconsistent." 29 C.F.R. § 1604. 1(b) (1977). The new regula-
tion states: "By virtue of section 703(h) [the Bennett Amendment], a defense based on the
Equal Pay Act may be raised in a proceeding under Title VII." Id. § 1604.8(b). Although this
statement is not necessarily inconsistent with its prior regulation, the EEOC's recent activity in
the area of job evaluation indicates that it has discarded its previous regulation entirely. See
note 130 infra.
113. 602 F.2d at 890.
114. The court hypothecated an employer who only employs women in one job and men in a
comparable but not substantially equal job, and suggested that the EPA would not prohibit the
employer from reducing the women's wages because of sex. Id. at 890 n.9. This hypothetical is
strikingly similar to City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702
(1978), where an employer's greater deduction for pension benefits from its female employees
was held to be based on sex. Although, in both cases, female plaintiffs would compare their
treatment to the treatment of men to prove sex discrimination, the particular jobs held by each
are irrelevant. See notes 30-34 and accompanying text supra.
115. 602 F.2d at 890 n.9. The court noted that when a complainant's job is unique her boss
could, without violating the EPA, tell her that he would pay her more if she were male. Id.
Her proof of discrimination would not require job comparisons, and in fact is independent of job
comparisons.
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still have enabled Title VII to reach the court's examples. If the Gunther
court had concluded instead that when a claim does not depend upon a
showing of equal work between the plaintiff's job and other employees' jobs,
a Title VII action could be brought independent of the EPA, then the situa-
tions it mentioned still would be prohibited by Title VII. Under such a
holding, Title VII plaintiffs could demonstrate sex discrimination in wages
either by comparing the content of jobs using the EPA's standards or by
presenting evidence other than job comparisons. The rationale for this hold-
ing is simply that, with the EPA, Congress established the only permissible
use of job comparisons to show sex discrimination in wages and that the
Bennett Amendment to Title VII manifests Congress' intent to transfer this
limited evidentiary use of job comparisons to Title VII. Further, because the
EPA does not address the case in which sex discrimination is not proven by
job comparisons, Title VII is available as an independent device in these
cases. Of course, such a holding would not allow Title VII plaintiffs, like
those in Gunther, to engage in comparisons of the value of dissimilar jobs.
But by ignoring the delicate balance formulated in the EPA between dis-
criminatory practices and market wage setting, by contorting the Bennett
Amendment's language, and by dissembling that amendment's legislative
history as well as agency regulations, the Gunther court has become sub
silentio the first circuit court in the country to allow a theory of recovery
based on comparing the value of dissimilar jobs. 116
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS:
GUNTHER'S IMPACT ON MARKET WAGE SETTING MECHANISMS
To better understand the potential impact of the Gunther decision, one
must realize that, in general, employers attempt to calibrate wages with job
value, ' 17 and that the field of wage and salary administration '" provides the
methods to assess the value of jobs.1 1 9 In fact, although a court's EPA task
is to determine simply whether two jobs are equal, and not to decide the
relative value of entirely different jobs, the EPA's criteria of skill, effort,
116. Of course, courts are not bound by a sub silentio holding. United States v. L. A. Tucker
Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952); Arant v. Lane, 245 U.S. 166, 170 (1917); Cross v. Burke,
146 U.S. 82, 87 (1892).
117. See generally LANOSNER & ZOLLITSCH, supra note 55, at 83; R. HENDERSON, COMPEN-
SATION MANAGEMENT 85 (1979) [hereinafter cited as HENDERSON]; C. LYTLE, JOB EVALUA-
TION METHODS 134 (1946) [hereinafter cited as LYTLE].
118. This field, also called compensation management, is normally incorporated as a man-
agement function assumed by an organization's human relations department. It has been de-
scribed as a discipline requiring "planning, developing, directing, and controlling all phases of
employee compensation and methods of remuneration." LANGSNER & ZOLLITSCH, supra note
50, at 1.
119. See LANGSNER & ZOLLITSCH, supra note 50, at 329-54; HENDERSON, supra note 117, at
146-67; LYTLE, supra note 117, at 134-40.
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responsibility and working conditions are the most basic factors used in job
evaluation systems.120
Wage and salary administration attempts to objectify fundamentally sub-
jective employer wage decisions 121 by systematizing the achievement of
employers' two primary goals in setting wages. First, employers wish to es-
tablish wages that are internally equitable, that is, they seek to ensure that
employees' jobs are properly ranked on the company's scale of possible wage
rates in order to minimize employee discontent and departure. 122 Second,
employers wish to set wages that are externally equitable, that is, they seek
to ensure that their wages will enable them to retain capable employees and
competitively recruit new personnel.12 Accordingly, an employer will in-
stall a wage-setting system that best effectuates its current emphasis on in-
ternal or external equity.12 4
While there are numerous, often subtle variations among available wage-
setting systems, 1 25 most utilize a three-step process. To ensure internal
equity, jobs are evaluated and then ranked on the basis of predetermined
"compensable factors." 126 Next, to ensure external equity, job market sur-
veys are conducted to determine what wage rates will enable employers to
retain and attract qualified employees. 127  Finally, to ensure currency, the
wage rates established for all jobs 128 and for individual employees are
120. Congress adopted the criteria of skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions in
the EPA in response to testimony of business representatives about job evaluation techniques.
See HEARING ON H.R. 3861, BEFORE THE SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 139, 194, 243, 252, 258-59 (1963); EQUAL
PAY ACT OF 1963: HEARINGS ON S. 882 AND S. 910 BEFORE THE SENATE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR
OF THE COMM. ON LABOR & PUBLIC WELFARE, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 142, 145 (1963); H.R.
REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963) ("This language recognizes that there are many
factors which may be used to measure the relationship between jobs .... These factors will be
found in a majority of job classification systems").
These four factors are called "universal factors" by experts in the wage and salary administra-
tion field, see, e.g., HENDERSON, supra note 117, at 113, because they help identify elements
common to all jobs. But even the experts do not agree as to the definition of these factors or the
subcomponents of each. Id. at 116-20; LYTLE, supra note 117, at 51-65. One expert states that
literally "hundreds of compensable factors have been identified and defined." HENDERSON,
supra note 117, at 112.
121. J. BERG, MANAGING COMPENSATION 87 (1976).
122. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, JOB EVALUATION: AN ANALYTIC REVIEW, IN-
TERIM REPORT TO THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 1 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as NAS INTERIM REPORT].
123. Id.; LANGSNER & ZOLLITSCH, supra note 50, at 51; HENDERSON, supra note 117, at 36.
124. These two goals are not always compatible. For example, an increase in the starting
wage intended to attract new clerks may create a situation where formerly hired clerks are paid
less than newly hired, inexperienced clerks. See also J. BERG, MANAGING COMPENSATION 77-86
(1976) (arguing that contribution to the organization is an underrated consideration).
125. See generally NAS INTERIM REPORT, supra note 122.
126. HENDERSON, supra note 117, at 111-30.
127. See LANGSNER & ZOLLITSCH, supra note 50, at 281-308; HENDERSON, supra note 117,
at 191-222.
128. See authorities cited in note 127 supra.
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periodically re-evaluated 129 and adjusted accordingly. Absent a centralized
means of defining the worth of each and every job in the country, 1 30 job
valuations will vary among employers and resulting wage rates will vary
among labor markets."'3  Ultimately, the job market has the most significant
impact on wages.' 32
The market wage-setting process comes under attack by a claim requiring
comparisons of the value of dissimilar jobs when plaintiffs charge that an
employer's job evaluation and wage system is discriminatory per se. For
instance, in Christensen v. Iowa, 133 clerical workers alleged that they were
paid less by an employer whose job evaluation system awarded them as
many points as maintenance workers. The employer responded that the
tighter market for maintenance jobs caused the wage disparity even though
it believed that the clerical workers deserved about the same wages. The
plaintiffs countered that the job market discriminates against women by de-
valuing traditionally "female jobs," and that the market merely reflects the
sex discrimination of individual employers. While the Christensen court re-
buffed this challenge to the market wage-setting system, 13 4 the Gunther
court's expansive interpretation of Title VII's protection suggests that it
might not reach the same result when the plaintiff does not seek equal
pay. 135  Indeed, the Gunther court specifically noted the matron's evidence
that their employer valued their jobs more than it paid them. 136 Thus, the
potential for a Christensen-like problem is present under the Gunther deci-
sion.
129. This process of performance reviews and salary increases should, however, be kept con-
ceptually separate from the process of setting entrance wages. After an employee is hired, his or
her wage will be determined by merit and not, theoretically, by the job market's going rate,
although in fact the two will be closely related because employers also wish to retain their
employees. See generally W. RONAN & E. PRIEN, PERSPECTIVES ON THE MEASUREMENT OF
HUMAN PERFORMANCE (1971).
130. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has initiated a three-pronged in-
vestigation into comparable worth issues. First, it has engaged the National Academy of Sci-
ences to investigate whether the available job evaluation systems could be employed to evalu-
ate dissimilar jobs in an unbiased fashion, and if not, to develop procedures that the Commis-
sion would then presumably impose on those employers subject to the provisions of Title VII.
NAS INTERIM REPORT, supra note 122, at xi. Second, on April 28, 1980 it opened three days of
public hearings on these issues. [1980] DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) 2, A-14, E-1 (April 28, 1980);
[19801 FED. REG. OF EMPL. SERV. 3-4 (May 15, 1980); [1980] DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-8, E-1
(April 30, 1980). Third, it will selectively litigate cases to gain judicial support for its efforts to
regulate wage levels. [1980] DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-14 (April 28, 1980).
131. LYTLE, supra note 117, at 178-79.
132. HENDERSON, supra note 117, at 225-26.
133. 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
134. See note 42 supra.
135. See notes 65-76 and accompanying text supra.
136. 602 F.2d at 891 n.ll. The evidence offered was that the matron's supervisor thought the
matrons were worth more than they were paid. Id. In fact, at one time he recommended a
wage increase to the wage level of deputy sheriffs. Petitioner's Brief at 10.
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Similarly, an allegation that a job evaluation system is discriminatorily
applied also brings the market wage system into question. For example, in
Krumbeck v. John Oster Manufacturing Co.,137 the plaintiff alleged that the
employer's job evaluation system arbitrarily assigned lesser wage ranges to
jobs performed by females than it would if those jobs were performed by
males. 138 In effect, the plaintiffs contended that the employer's system
weighted "female characteristics" less heavily. Because an employer who
uses a formal job evaluation system becomes a microcosm of the job market
through its market surveys, such a claim indirectly challenges the market.
Although the employer in Gunther did not utilize a formal job evaluation
system, the plaintiff's evidence was that the employer's job evaluations, re-
flected in wages, disadvantaged female employees. 139 The Gunther court's
remand of the case to the lower court to consider this evidence,14 0 leaves
room in the Gunther decision for claims like those raised in Krumbeck.
It should be noted that the nature of the court's intervention in the mar-
ket significantly differs in adjudicating claims like those raised in Christensen
and those raised in Krumbeck. In the case of claims that an employer's sys-
tem is per se discriminatory, as in Christensen, courts will be forced to
answer the yet unanswerable question: How are wages to be established if
not by reference to the labor market? 141 Judicial fiat is a poor substitute for
the market mechanism and may spawn labor shortages, 14 2 rippling pay infla-
tion 143 and other deleterious economic consequences. 144 On the other
137. 313 F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
138. Id. at 259. The court rejected this contention because the suit was brought solely under
the EPA and because the EPA does not allow the comparison of dissimilar jobs. Id. at 260.
139. See note 72 supra.
140. 602 F.2d at 891.
141. See L. Smith, The EEOC's Bold Foray into Job Evaluation, FORTUNE, Sept. 11, 1978,
at 58. One court realized the dilemma presented by a claim based on job value: "[W]hat is
the Court supposed to do when deciding the equality of pay of doctors and lawyers?" Lemons v.
City & County of [)enver, 17 FEP Cas. 906, 912 (D. Colo. 1978), aff d, No. 78-1499 (10th Cir.
1980).
142. The market-pricing system will react to labor shortages by increasing pay levels. See,
e.g., Secretaries Get Better Pay, Broader Work as Demand Outpaces Supply, Wall St. J., Jan.
29, 1980 at 1, col. 5. Job evaluation techniques, when severed from the market, will determine
wage rates by gauging the intrinsic value of jobs. NAS INTERIM REPORT, supra note 122, at
35-36.
143. For instance, if the Christensen court had ordered the employer to pay clerical workers
as much as maintenance workers, the attraction of employees to this employer and away from
other employers would place pressure on the market to increase wages generally. The problem
becomes more complex when wages are also set through collective bargaining with an employee
union. See Equality of Opportunity: The Emerging Challenge in Employment, CONF. BD. OF
CAN. (No. 4 1978).
144. One thoughtful study concluded:
Implementing the comparable work doctrine will increase the wages of some
women. However, the corresponding misallocation of resources will force down
aggregate personal income for everyone. Incentives to perform well will be reduced
in controlled occupations, as statistical indicators of qualifications again take prece-
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hand, a claim that an employer's wage-setting system discriminates as
applied would necessitate a circumscribed judicial incursion into the wage
market. Courts could, and should, assent to the employer's job evaluation
criteria and wage-setting system but review inconsistent applications be-
tween male and female employees from which to infer sex discrimination. 145
If, however, the Gunther decision signals a growing tendency of courts to
intercede in market forces, employers should be on notice that courts may
increasingly disrupt the market premise of traditional compensation systems.
POLICY DILEMMA:
SABOTAGING TITLE VII
The Gunther plaintiffs' successful argument will doubtless become the
model for future attempts by plaintiffs to contort the EPA's principles by
extending Title VII to claims based on job value. The matrons did not at-
tempt to persuade the court that job value comparisons are permissible
under Title VII. In fact, no court faced squarely with the job value question
has decided it in favor of allowing such comparisons. 146  Instead, the
Gunther plaintiffs argued that sex discrimination influenced their wages
vis-h-vis the wages of male employees and requested a chance to prove it.
Faced with convincing evidence that something was amiss in the employer's
practice of compensating employees in different jobs, the Gunther court re-
vealed a willingness to clear away technical barriers to relief when Congress
had not positively precluded a method of recovery. In short, the lesson of
Gunther for future Title VII plaintiffs is that it is not so much what they say
as how they say it that may determine whether a court will allow recovery
based on job value comparisons.
The Gunther court's approach to reconciling the relationship between
Title VII and the EPA indicates that Title VII predominance in wage dis-
crimination cases is assured. The decision also offers the first judicial sup-
port, however indirect, for the EEOC's recent activity in the job evaluation
area. 147 The EEOC undoubtedly will embrace the Gunther decision to sus-
tain its current concern that a relationship may exist between female job
segregation and depressed female wages overall. 148
dence over observed individual productivity and performance. Finally, considerable
female unemployment will result, particularly in those occupations now pre-
dominately filled by women, whose wages will be boosted to the level of higher
paying "'comparable" jobs.
C. LINDSAY, EQUAL PAY FOR COMPARABLE WORK: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A NEW AN-
TIDISCRIMINArION DOCTRINE 33 (1980) (published by the University of Miami's Law and
Economics Center) [hereinafter cited as LINDSAY].
145. There is precedent for this more limited intrusion in the decisions of the War Labor
Board. See, e.g., In re General Electric Co. and Westinghouse Electric Corp., 28 War Lab.
Rep. 667, 677 (1945).
146. See cases cited in notes 42 & 43 supra.
147. See note 130 supra.
148. [1980] CCH Labor Law Reports (Employment .Practices), Rep. No. 94, Jan. 17, 1980,
No. 969, at 1.
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Yet, the comparable job doctrine, while founded upon Title VII, could
potentially defeat Title VII's purposes. If females are ultimately to progress
into more responsible management jobs, then increasing wage levels in tra-
ditionally female jobs-because these jobs are "'worth" as much as higher
paid traditionally male jobs-will be counterproductive to Title VII's ulti-
mate objective of ensuring equal employment opportunity. The Gunther
formulation will tend to ensure the result of overall wage equality but only
at the cost of perpetuating female occupational ghettos. 149  Such a nondis-
crimination doctrine is, therefore, self-defeating.
CONCLUSION
In Gunther, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
became the first circuit to decide that the EPA's equal pay for equal work
principle is not the exclusive standard for determining the existence of sex
discrimination in wages under Title VII. The court's preoccupation with Title
VII in reconciling the overlap between Title VII and the EPA in the narrow
but significant area of wage discrimination means that its decision will permit
Title VII plaintiffs to pursue claims based on job value. As a matter of public
policy, any employment discrimination is pernicious; however, as a matter of
market economics, the potential expansion of the government's role in de-
termining wage levels is of great concern. Courts should be more attentive
to the balance between market forces and equality of the sexes established
by Congress in the EPA. Courts that decide, like Gunther, that Title VII
overrides this fine balance should, however, limit their incursions into mar-
ket wage-setting mechanisms by reviewing only an employer's inconsistent
application of its wage-setting system, and by refusing to consider employer
reliance on market demand and supply. Any other -approach would not only
tax judicial expertise but also could seriously endanger the progression of
women into upper professional and management ranks. Whether the courts
are, in fact, empowered to sit as a review board for market wage determina-
tions at all is a question that only the United States Supreme Court or Con-
gress can, and should, answer. 150
Jeffrey Alexander Blevins
149. See generally LINDSAY, supra note 144.
150. As this Note went to press, the Third Circuit held in IUE v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., No. 79-189.3 & 79-1894 (3d Cir. Aug. 1, 1980), that the Bennett Amendment does not
preclude Title VII comparable job suits, reversing the lower court decision cited in notes 43, 68
and 87 supra. The increasing conflict among the circuit courts is further testimony of the need
for a Supreme Court decision.
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